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this. . one is that Apple told the feds not to try to
change the password, and they tried anyway. . the
second is that the feds have only asked Apple to
retrieve the information from the phone, and Apple
has said that they cannot. . the first was from a
major cybersecurity expert on Fox News, and the
second was from their former CIA guy Mike Baker.
there is definitely more to this than the lawyers
on TV are telling us. -- j
.
occurred. . interesting, but not likely true. -- j
.
https://assets.documentcloud.org/docu...
To me it looks like there is a loophole where Apple can keep the phone and just turn over the data, or maybe not.
How this is addressed is by the Plausible Deniability Encryption (PDE) software pre-creating a large file of random gibberish, feeding for entropy from user mouse movements, keyboard, plus other system PRNG sources. The user declares their maximum requirement for data storage, and the system allocates an entropy file 3-10 times bigger (though the user can change this), and allocates the user's chosen partitions within it. The data used by the partitions is non-contiguous, and the partitions and chaff are all AES256 encrypted, with separate keys.
Then, when a partition is used, its directory structure is AES256 encrypted using a hash of the user's password. The use of separate symmetrical keys, plus the rolling cipher, offers protection against birthday attacks,
This means there is tremendous cost of discerning AES-encrypted white noise from AES-encrypted plaintext. This cost can be raised further by random download and utilisation of text in the user's native language as a source of 'chaff', similarly encrypted but with yet another key.
Once the one big monolithic file is created, it should never grow or shrink in size and, ideally, should not be hosted on magnetic media. SSDs are fine. This eliminates the risk of extracting deltas from residual magnetic charge on disk sectors.
Presuming you use a standard operating system data structure to manage your disk files the existence of a file must be in the directory or at the very least it has to be ruled out of new allocations. I suppose you could go the 'superfile route' but there is still the ability to compare the data present and not present and detect that you are holding out.
It's called Plausible Deniability Encryption, and was invented by a small team of people led by software developer, WikiLeaks founder and political fugitive Julian Assange.
How Plausible Deniability Encryption works is by letting the user set as many different passwords as they like. Each password, if entered, reveals different areas of data. Unless a password is entered, there is no technical or mathematical proof that an area of data even exists. Government agents, when inspecting a Plausible Deniability data store, will just see random gibberish. They will have no idea whether there are zero, one, two or even 30 separate data areas. The only way to prove a data area actually exists is to first posses the password which unlocks it.
If a suspect is being detained and pressured to disclose "the decryption password", they can provide one or two passwords to unlock a couple of the data areas, but only ones of low to medium sensitivity. For instance, a political activist may choose to unlock a semi-sensitive area that will expose them to a month in prison, but the feds won't be able to prove that more sensitive data - the 20 years in supermax kind - even exists.
I'm not sure how many Plausible Deniability Encryption products there are out in the wild - fairly few if any at the moment I'm guessing.
I wrote a working proof-of-concept prototype for one, inspired by aspects of Assange's first version, but mothballed the project due to lack of funds. At the time, it got a good write-up in the tech blogs, so it was sad to let it go. What are your thoughts about the commercial viability of such a project, were I to resurrect it and fundraise for it?
Jan
The automatic delete
The limitation on entering the password only through the screen, not through a device
The automatic pause between password attempts.
'I' as the owner, have requested access to something that is 'mine' and, in this case, the gov is working with 'me' (aka County of San Bernadino) to accomplish that.
Insofar as China is concerned, the article offered suppositions but no proof. I think that it is going to do more damage to socialism in China for people to have iphones even if their gov has one more way of keeping track of their people. Do you know about the codes that the Chinese people are spontaneously developing to keep from being tagged by trigger word searches? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yrcaH...
Those river-mud-horses are not able to keep the lid on the Chinese people.
Jan
own equipment and providing the information?
that is the service which I wish the FBI would
accept, in this case. -- j
.
.
the FBI should have it by now. . or else, they are
falling behind in the international spy race. -- j
p.s. whatever happened to the world in which
the FBI worked inside the u.s. and the CIA
worked outside?
.
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